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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Addressing the social protection needs of households during emergencies is a major 
development issue. Without social protection measures, such as cash transfers for basic 
needs1  or workfare programs, many households faced with large economic and natural 
shocks might deplete their human and physical capital, reducing their ability to participate in 
economic development. Social protection measures (cash transfers, in particular) are 
therefore assuming a growing role in the World Bank to help the poor cope with the 
aftermath of a disaster. In South Asia, all three recent major emergency-related operations in 
South Asia (Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Pakistan) included cash transfers components. 
 
 This discussion paper, an input to the South Asia region’s Social Protection and 
Hazard Risk Management Strategies, describes the cash transfer instruments supported by 
the Bank in South Asia, evaluates their design and implementation, and suggests 
improvements to increase their effectiveness. Based on available evidence, the paper finds 
that cash transfers appear to have performed well in providing relief to affected households, 
suggesting that they should remain an integral part of Bank-financed support for natural 
disasters. The paper also suggests that the Bank can ensure timely and high-quality support 
through a best-practice design toolkit, a right-on-time technical assistance facility, and by 
integrating social protection in emergency preparedness by building the capacity of national 
social assistance (cash transfers) agencies to respond to natural disasters. Although the focus 
is on cash transfers, the note also discusses other types of social protection mechanisms used 
in emergencies in South Asia and worldwide, e.g., workfare or social care for the vulnerable, 
and which might also appropriate for including in Bank emergency operations.2 The note 
covers South Asia, but lessons from this region may also be relevant for governments of other 
developing countries and donors.  
 
 Finally, while the focus of the paper is on social protection instruments for natural 
disasters, several of these instruments have also proved useful in post-conflict situations and 
in economic crises. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Social protection comprises safety nets and social security programs. Cash transfers are one component of 
the safety net programs. Income support or social assistance are also terms used for cash transfers, and 
these terms are used interchangeably in the text.  
2 The paper discusses cash transfers in case of emergencies, cash transfers have been successfully used to 
protect laid off workers during major economic restructuring, economic crises, and to address the needs of 
post-conflict populations. 
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HELPING SOUTH ASIA COPE BETTER WITH 
NATURAL DISASTERS: 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
South Asia is prone to natural disasters. In earlier times, these disasters often caused 
massive famines that prompted government action. A stone inscription found in 
Bangladesh dating from the third century BC contains an instruction from a higher 
government official to subordinate officers to supply paddy to distressed areas. The Great 
Bengal Famine of 1943 was precipitated by crop failures beginning in 1938 and events 
accompanying the Second World War and had an estimated death toll of 3.5 million. 
Thus, disasters have been a recurring feature in South Asia. 
 
 More recently, between 1990 and 2007, some 682 natural disasters were 
registered in the region, killing an estimated almost 400,000 people, affecting many 
more, and causing severe economic damages (See Annex 1). India, Bangladesh, and 
Afghanistan were the most affected countries in South Asia in terms of number of events, 
while Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan suffered most fatalities. The most common types 
of natural disasters were floods, wind storms, and epidemics, while the natural disasters 
that caused the most deaths were wind storms, earthquakes, wave/surge (including 
tsunami), and floods. Most disasters are small and localized; at the most 2 percent of 
(registered) disasters in this period caused more than 1,000 deaths. The disaster types 
with the average deaths per event were wave/surge, earthquake, and windstorm. Thus, the 
casualty toll from natural disasters in South Asia is dominated by rapid onset events 
unlike in the past, where droughts and other slow onset events wrought havoc.3 
 
 South Asian countries have coped relatively well with recent major disasters. 
Severe disasters such as the tsunami, or the Pakistan earthquake did not cause massive 
famine or post-disaster mortality. The population affected by these severe disasters was 
provided food and shelter in the immediate relief phase; social protection (cash support) 
in the medium-term transition from relief to reconstruction; and housing and 
infrastructure rehabilitation in the reconstruction phase. Field evidence suggests that early 
relief plays a crucial role in helping affected communities cope and recover and is a 
prominent indication to those affected of the government’s commitment to rebuild. 
 
 The Bank’s assistance has played an important role in helping South Asian 
countries cope with disasters. South Asia has a major disaster-related lending portfolio of 
more than $10 billion since 1980. Two of the top ten countries on the Bank’s global top-
                                                 
3 Source EM-DAT: “The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database”, www.em-dat.net, Université 
Catholique de Louvain - Brussels – Belgium. 
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10 list of disaster financing are South Asian: India and Bangladesh. Between 1984 and 
2005, a total of 71 disaster projects were implemented in these two countries. The Bank’s 
support in South Asia reflects its broader emphasis on helping countries cope with 
emergencies worldwide. Since 1984, the Bank has financed natural disaster activities in 
528 projects (including 89 ERLs) across all its regions totaling $26 billion and 
constituting some 10 percent of total global Bank lending over the last two decades. 
 
 Most recently, the Bank has redoubled its efforts to improve its capacity for 
responding quickly and in a poverty-sensitive way to emergencies, such as natural 
disasters. In response to recommendations of an IEG evaluation report, the Bank has 
issued a new Policy on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies. This policy sets out a 
framework for faster and more effective response to crises and emergencies better aligned 
with borrower needs and the Bank’s experience and current engagement.4 Noteworthy 
provisions include (i) streamlined processing and approval procedures; (ii) clarification 
that the Bank can support development objectives such as preservation of human, social, 
and institutional capital; and (iii) contingent emergency loans. Contingent emergency 
loans are loans to countries with high disaster risk determined to have appropriate 
institutional and implementation capacity to respond to emergencies. These loans, once 
triggered after the onset of a disaster, would disburse against a positive list of goods 
required under the borrower’s emergency recovery plan and could offer very fast 
financial support. A multi-donor global partnership for hazard management, called the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery to support this initiative has also 
been launched This policy change provides an opportunity to streamline the Bank’s post-
disaster income support. Finally, as recommended by the 2000/01 World Development 
report, the Bank’s emergency response is increasingly incorporating poverty-sensitive 
disaster response planning, e.g., using social protection instruments, to help households 
cope with disasters. Social protection support is complementing mainstream components 
of the Bank’s disaster support operations including, e.g., reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.  
 
 The South Asia region has also launched a Regional Hazard Risk Management 
Program focused on emergency preparedness, risk mitigation, and institutional capacity 
building. The strategy also includes the provision of social protection support to 
vulnerable groups affected by disasters. The protection of individual welfare in 
emergencies is also a tenet of the region’s Social Protection Strategy. For this reason, in 
all three countries which experienced recent natural disasters––Maldives, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka––the Bank’s emergency response included social protection (cash transfer) 
components. In addition, in Pakistan, the Bank’s emergency response also included 
support for those disabled in the disaster (as well as other disabled individuals) in the 
earthquake-affected areas. 
 
 The purpose of this note is to review South Asia’s recent experience in providing 
social protection (mainly cash transfers) support to the poor in emergency response 
operations, with a view to improving its effectiveness. Available evidence suggests that 
                                                 
4 A multi-donor global partnership for hazard management, called the Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery to support this initiative has also been launched 
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cash transfer programs are in high demand by client governments and affected 
communities, appear to perform well in helping households cope with disasters, and 
suggests some guidelines for improving their design and implementation. It concludes 
that the Bank could provide timely and high-quality support through a best-practice 
design toolkit on social protection, a right-on-time technical assistance facility, and the 
integration of social protection in emergency preparedness by building capacity in social 
assistance/cash transfers agencies for helping households cope in emergencies. While the 
note focuses on evaluating cash transfers, it also reviews other social protection 
instruments commonly used for coping with disasters (e.g., workfare and social welfare 
and care services). South Asia is the focus of this note, but the findings may also be of 
interest and relevance to other developing countries and donors. 
 
 The organization of the note is as follows. The following section overviews the 
main social protection instruments used in natural disasters (workfare, cash transfers and 
social care services). A description of the cash transfer programs supported by the Bank, 
their similarities and differences, available evidence on their impact, and preliminary 
lessons learned from their implementation is provided in the third section. The paper 
concludes with implications for the Bank and Governments in making social protection 
an integral part of ex-ante planning for disaster response.5  
                                                 
5 The note does not discuss the related, but slightly different, topic of ex-ante insurance against disaster risk 
These topics are taken up by Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Pantelis Solomon, and Renos Vakis 
(2006) in “Uninsured risk and asset protection: Can conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety 
nets?”, World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper 604. 
  4
 
2. ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE LIVING STANDARDS AND 
POVERTY INCIDENCE 
The purpose of social protection instruments, when used in disasters, is to protect basic 
consumption and, if needed, to provide temporary employment. Without income support, 
households, particularly the poor, would deplete their physical and human capital and fall 
deeper into poverty, particularly as disasters can often exhaust community support 
mechanisms. The main social protection instruments used in time of disasters are (i) 
social assistance/cash transfers to meet basic needs (ii) workfare, (temporary low wage 
employment); and (iii) social care services (e.g., community-based rehabilitation for 
disabled, family placement for orphans, legal support to widows). 
 
Cash Support  
 
In normal or non-disaster, conditions, cash transfers or social assistance programs help 
provide minimum income support to the chronic poor in order to meet a country’s 
distributional objectives.6 In times of disasters, cash transfers allow affected households 
to preserve their human and physical assets, and therefore prevent the deepening of 
chronic poverty that would otherwise result from natural disasters.  
 
 In general, transfers to the poor can be given in cash or in-kind, e.g., food. Cash 
assistance provides households with greater flexibility and choice in meeting their basic 
needs as compared to in-kind transfers. Cash infusions in the economy can also help 
stimulate supply, though they can also generate inflation in supply constrained 
conditions. Cash is also less vulnerable to distributional and storage issues that plague 
food based safety nets. However, food may be preferred over cash in the circumstances 
where food markets are not functioning and where households are not able to meet basic 
food needs.7 Inferior food goods can also be self-targeted, while cash transfers sometimes 
need to be targeted more explicitly to particular groups. (See Annex 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of the trade-offs between food and in-kind transfers). 8 
 
 Cash support has been highlighted as a successful and growing area of support in 
disaster assistance in a recent IEG report:9  
 
“During the recovery process, getting cash support to victims quickly has 
positively affected people’s sense of safety and security. It has been a 
                                                 
6 World Bank (2007), Social Protection in Pakistan: Managing Household Risks and Vulnerability. Report 
No. 35472-PK; World Bank (2005), Social Safety Nets in Bangladesh: An Assessment, South Asia Human 
Development Unit. 
7 Paul Harvey (2006), “Editorial: mini special issue on cash transfers”, Disasters, 30(3): 273-276. See also  
Paul Harvey (2007), “Cash-based responses in emergencies”, HPG Report 24, ODI. 
8 Bank post-disaster income support in South Asia has been given mostly as cash, and elsewhere has used 
food only in rare circumstances, in part because the Bank never was a major actor in relief, 
9 “Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development”. Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 2006. 
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prominent first sign of the government’s support in a time of acute need. 
Since 1984, the Bank has funded over $850 million in cash support (cash 
transfer, cash for work, and similar programs) in the context of 11 
projects, 5 of which are ongoing. Approximately 94 percent of these funds 
were lent since the Turkey Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Loan 
was appraised in 1999. In projects that have closed and been rated, four 
out of six were found to be satisfactory. Those rated unsatisfactory 
accounted for less than one percent of the funds allocated. When promptly 
provided, cash support enabled people to survive and get local economies 
moving again, and was reported as highly preferable to in-kind support by 
beneficiaries. For example, the 1999 Turkey earthquake reconstruction 
project implemented a cash transfer component that was widely 
considered successful, and even a model to be emulated, as four 
subsequent projects have already done.” 
 
 Cash transfers can complement well other types of post-disaster efforts, including 
housing10 and infrastructure reconstruction.11 IEG (2006) tells how this complementarity 
came to light in Gujarat:  
 
“…earthquake victims’ need for cash assistance became apparent to the 
Bank in an indirect way following the 2001 earthquake. Families were 
using the first installment of house construction funding to purchase food 
and other necessities to survive, rather than using it toward the 
construction. As a result, when it became time to issue the second 
installment, many of the families did not have the first phase of the house 
to show in order to receive the second installment.”12 
 
 These attributes have also made cash transfers attractive in other emergency 
situations. For example, cash transfers have helped households cope with post-conflict 
situations (UAS program in Sri Lanka IDPs, conditional cash transfer program for IDPs 
in Colombia) and have compensated households for income losses due to economic 
restructuring (e.g., price increases in Romania and layoffs in Eastern Europe). 
 
Workfare (cash-for-work) 
 
Workfare programs provide targeted employment for the poor in many countries around 
the world. Workfare has multiple objectives: provision of temporary employment to poor 
able bodied working age individuals during emergencies, providing cash support to the 
poor, and creating or maintaining assets. The work includes reconstruction or 
rehabilitation efforts, completion of small works such as clearing debris and 
reestablishing roads and water schemes. Workfare is needed immediately after the 
                                                 
10 Although housing support is often given as cash to house owners (against progress in rebuilding) it is not 
treated as income support for the purposes of this paper. 
11 Renos Vakis (2006) “Complementing Natural Disasters Management: The Role of Social Protection”, SP 
Discussion Paper 543. 
12 P. 152, “Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development”. Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 2006. 
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disaster when regular incomes have collapsed and unemployment is high. It has also been 
used in post-conflict situations to disarm and provide gainful employment to ex-
combatants (e.g., Bosnia, Senegal). Workfare can be used to complement cash grants or it 
can be phased in after the termination of cash grants to provide more incentive 
constrained cash support. The best mix of social protection programs: cash grants and 
workfare, or both depend on the country context.  
 
 Workfare has a long history going back to at least 19th century Britain and India, 
where it was used to avert famines;13 since the 1950s, food-for-work has also been used 
as an avenue for distributing bilateral food aid. 14  In South Asia, workfare is used 
routinely in rural areas of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India both during disasters and in 
normal times. India and Bangladesh in particular have a long experience of using 
workfare to respond to disasters. Their governments (with donor support in Bangladesh) 
have permanent cash-for-work and food-for-work programs that they roll out in response 
to national and local disasters: 
 
• In India, the Government has recently introduced the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme, an India-wide workfare program to provide 100 days of 
guaranteed employment to the poor. In Southern India successful workfare 
projects have been implemented by NGOs, such as those by OXFAM, in response 
to the tsunami.  
• In Bangladesh, workfare is routinely part of the response to disasters. For 
example, following the 2004 floods, permanent workfare programs such as 
Vulnerable Group Development, Vulnerable Group Feeding, Food-for-Work, Test 
Relief, and Gratuitous Relief distributed a total of 0.74 million metric tons of food 
grains in addition to some cash assistance, corrugated iron sheets, and clothing.  
• Pakistan has implemented three labor-intensive workfare projects targeted to the 
Afghan refugee population during 1984-1996. Although their overall impact on 
poverty is not known, the projects created 22.6 million person days of 
employment over a 12-year period and transferred vocational skills to 
participants.  
• In Sri Lanka, in response to the Tsunami, a cash-for-work program was 
introduced and implemented through INGOs, NGOs and community-based 
organizations. The works ranged from cleaning of debris to irrigation 
infrastructure management. Most of the resources (about Rs. 750 million) were 
spent on wages and the rest on tools and materials.  
• Many UN agencies and NGOs regularly use workfare on a small or medium scale 
in disasters, for example to maintain or improve camps for the displaced.15  
 
                                                 
13 Dreze, J. and A. Sen (1989) “Hunger and Public Action”, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
14 Subbarao, K. et al. (1997) “Safety Net Programs and Poverty Reduction”, Directions in Development, 
World Bank.  
15 Paul Harvey (2007). “Cash-based Responses in Emergencies”, HPG Report 24, ODI. 
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• The Bank has also supported workfare programs in response to emergencies. The 
World Bank has supported very large, national-scale workfare programs in Korea 
and Argentina16 in response to unemployment caused by the financial crisis.  
 
 Workfare has many advantages. It helps affected communities return to normal 
life, offering hope and dignity. Offering manual labor with a low wage tends to attract 
near-poor and poor workers, allowing for self-targeting. If the wage is set very high, it 
tends to attract the non-poor and distort labor markets. Workfare is also justified when the 
assets constructed are of value to poor households and communities. Project selection is 
therefore important. Works that do not require much planning and capital such as clearing 
debris are best suited for workfare programs, but almost any job that requires unskilled 
labor can be offered as workfare.17 However, large-scale implementation of workfare can 
be complex and not easy to safeguard from fiduciary problems, especially if there is no 
prior implementation infrastructure. One of the most frequently raised criticism of 
workfare is that too many projects are useless, merely digging holes and filling them up 
again, or constructing roads from nowhere to nowhere.18 Thus, capacity building for 
workfare programs, including their roll out in case of disasters, needs to be developed ex-
ante in designated social assistance and local government agencies as part of the planning 
for disasters. 
 
Social Welfare/Care Services 
 
Some very vulnerable groups such as widows, orphans, and persons with disabilities have 
special needs in disaster situations—beyond cash, food, housing and employment 
support. For example, orphans require care and shelter, while persons with disabilities 
need rehabilitation, and many affected groups require psychosocial support. Social 
welfare and care services that link these groups to essential services, e.g., family 
placement or community based rehabilitation are an essential compliment to cash transfer 
programs in normal situations, and often an important need in disaster (and post-conflict) 
situations.19  
 
 While not financed by the Bank, several types of social welfare and care services 
were an essential component of emergency response in Sri Lanka for family placement of 
orphans, providing psycho-social support, and reducing abuse in camps. These services 
can also be useful in post-conflict situations. 
 
                                                 
16 The Argentina program was evaluated by Emanuela Galasso, and Martin Ravallion (2003): “Social 
Protection in a Crisis: Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas.”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2004. 
17 A study of 122 targeted (but not necessarily disaster related) programs around the world using a variety 
of targeting methods concluded that workfare in Argentina was the best targeted of all, with 80 percent of 
benefits going to the bottom quintile. See Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004) “Targeting of Transfers in 
Developing Countries: Review of Lessons and Experiences”, World Bank. 
18 Examples—of both useful and useless projects abound—see for example Paul Harvey (2007) “Cash-
based Responses in Emergencies”, HPG Report 24, ODI. 
19 See Save the Children (2005) “Cash for Recovery: Feasibility study on a capital-based income-
generation scheme for tsunami-affected households in Trincomalee District, Sri Lanka”, 
http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/Commissioned_sLankacash.pdf. 
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 The Bank has only recently initiated support for social care services for disabled 
in emergency operations in South Asia. In Pakistan, the Bank is supporting rehabilitation 
and independent living of disabled persons, including those who suffered a disability 
during the earthquake through the Pakistan Earthquake Disability Project two linked 
grants to a disabled persons’ organization and an international disability NGO. This suite 
of projects will help the Bank understand better what role it can play to promote 
rehabilitation of persons with disabilities in disaster affected areas in environments of low 
capacity. Still, there is a major gap in efforts and a concomitant gap in knowledge of what 
works and how to deliver such services in disaster situations.  
  9
 
3. FACTORS AFFECTING LIVING STANDARDS  
In South Asia, the World Bank recently supported large-scale government implemented 
cash transfer interventions as part of its overall disaster response following major 
disasters in Sri Lanka and Maldives (2004), and Pakistan (2005), building on the 
successful example of the cash transfer program implemented to help earthquake victims 
in Turkey. Following on basic relief efforts, and rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, 
the Bank used the deployment of cash grants to affected households on a remarkably 
large scale. While these cash grants are referred to in Bank documents as livelihood 
grants, suggesting conditionality on income generation, they were for the most standard 
social assistance/cash transfers that allowed households to meet basic needs.  
 
 The emergency cash transfer package to help households meet basic needs for 
each country is described in detail below. Cash grants (of much higher amounts) were 
also provided to households with damaged housing to aid reconstruction.20 
 
 Pakistan: About 250,000 households received Bank-financed cash grants in six 
monthly payments of Rs. 3,000 (US$50) per household. The Government itself also 
financed payments to compensate for death and injury. Each family that suffered a death 
of a next of kin received Rs. 100,000 (US$1,660); families who suffered multiple deaths 
also received Rs. 100,000. Compensation for injuries ranged from Rs. 15,000 to 50,000, 
with the highest payments going to amputees.  
 
 Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka gave tsunami-affected households four rounds of cash 
grants of LKR 5,000 ($50) per round. The first and second round of cash transfers 
covered 250,000 households, but the number of households was reduced in subsequent 
rounds, e.g., 160,000 households received benefit in the third round.21  
 
 Maldives: Maldives gave a one-time cash transfer for basic needs to 10,000 
households affected by the Tsunami. The transfer amount was Rf. 500, 1000, or 1500 
(US$39-117) per household member depending on damage (corresponding to 2-6 weeks 
of average consumption). For example, a family of six with a completely damaged house 
received Rf. 9,000 (US$700).22 
 
                                                 
20 These packages also included cash grants for housing, rehabilitation and reconstruction components 
outside the scope of this paper. 
21 Sri Lanka: Post Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction (2005): A Joint Report of the Government of Sri 
Lanka and Development Partners. 
22 “Tsunami Impact Assessment Survey 2005: A socio-economic countrywide assessment at household 
level, six months after the tsunami”, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Maldives. 
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Table 1: Income Support Following Major Disasters in Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (and 
Turkey)23 
 Post-disaster 
income support, 
approximate 
($ total for a family 
of six, excluding 
housing support) 
Post-disaster 
income 
support 
(per person, 
in % of GDP 
per capita per 
year) 
Eligibility 
criteria 
Disbursement 
mechanism 
Maldives: house 
flooded, lost 
belongings 
234 1.5 
Maldives: house 
damaged 469 3.0 
Maldives: house 
lost 703 4.5 
House damaged 
by wave 
Cash delivered by 
task teams 
Pakistan: no deaths 
in household 300 (basic needs grants) 7.2 
House damaged 
and household 
vulnerable24 
Pakistan: serious 
injury/amputee 
1133 
(injury compensation 
and basic needs 
(livelihood) grants) 
27.4 
As above, and 
any member 
seriously injured 
Pakistan: one or 
more deaths 
2,000 
(death compensation 
and basic needs 
 ( livelihood grants) 
48.3 As above, and any member dead 
Cash grants: banks;  
Death/injury 
compensation: cash 
delivered by army 
teams 
Sri Lanka 200 
(if qualified for all 
four rounds of cash 
grants) 
2.9 
1st round: broadly 
affected 
Later rounds: 
affected and no 
regular income25 
Bank accounts 
Turkey: 2nd degree 
disability 653 3.4 
Turkey: 1st degree 
disability 1088 5.7 
Disability 
resulting from 
earthquake 
Turkey: death in 
household 1632 8.6 
Death resulting 
from earthquake 
Bank accounts 
Note: The table excludes support distributed by NGOs in kind or cash to affected households. 
 
Similarities and Differences in Approaches 
 
The cases reviewed above show many similarities but also a few differences in the 
Bank’s use of post-disaster social protection support.  
                                                 
23 We have included Turkey as an interesting comparator country where cash grants were also given for 
basic needs, disability and death of main household earner. 
24 The vulnerability criteria selected households with no senior government employee that were either 
headed by women not currently married, contained a disabled member, or contained five or more 
children. 
25 It appears that local officials had considerable discretion in determining eligibility and criteria may have 
varied between areas. 
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 The similarities include: 
 
• Bank support was provided in exceptionally devastating rapid-onset disasters in 
which there was political will for generous support to affected households; some 
of the lessons of these disasters may therefore not apply to less visible disasters or 
to slow-onset disasters. 
 
• The Bank-financed cash support in all three operations, as there was a clear need 
and client demand for income support to affected households. 
 
• The Bank decided, designed, deployed, and funded the assistance under great time 
pressure. This meant, among other things, that the design and implementation of 
Bank-funded income support did not always benefit as fully as possible from 
timely technical assistance. 
 
• Given emergency conditions, formal impact evaluations were not part of the 
operations at the time of approval. However, surveys or spot-checks were 
undertaken (e.g., Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) as part of the process to assess 
whether transfers were delivered to target groups. 
 
 There are also interesting differences in design and implementation arrangements: 
 
• Benefit amounts and frequency of payments differed significantly. For example, 
Pakistan, although the poorest among the countries compared here, offered much 
more generous support (especially when compared to GDP) than Maldives, Sri 
Lanka, or Turkey (Table 1). In Pakistan, affected families26 received between 
US$30027 (if eligible for the cash grants as per the vulnerability criteria28) and 
US$2,000 (if they also suffered a death), the equivalent of 7-48 percent of per 
capita GDP per member. In contrast, the income support per person was 3 percent 
of per capita GDP in Sri Lanka, and 1.5-4.5 percent of per capita GDP in 
Maldives.29 In all cases, the benefit amounts were much higher than the (usually 
very low30) regular benefit levels offered by these countries to social assistance 
beneficiaries (such as the chronic poor or those affected by smaller disasters 
where no foreign assistance is involved).  
 
• The frequency of payments varied as well. Benefits were paid out in one lump-
sum payment in Maldives (as in Turkey), in four tranches in Sri Lanka, and six 
                                                 
26 The Pakistan program used the unit of family (husband, wife, children) rather than household. As a 
result, there were instances of multiple beneficiary families under the same roof.  
27 The poverty line was used to calculate the amount of basic needs/livelihood grant. 
 
29 Cash transfers were 3-9 percent of per capita GDP in Turkey. 
30 For example, Pakistan gives regular cash transfer beneficiaries US$4-8 per household per month; Sri 
Lanka gives US$1-10 in its Samurdhi program; and Maldives gives US$40. 
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monthly rounds in Pakistan (for all eligible) with six additional rounds for the 
most vulnerable. 
 
• Eligibility criteria varied. Three main types of criteria were used (i) all 
households affected by damage to house; (ii) households within category (i) 
suffering loss/disability of household members/earners; and (iii) all poorest and 
most vulnerable households within category (i). For example in Maldives all 
households affected by damaged house were covered by the transfer. In Sri 
Lanka, the criteria defined by the Bank were both housing damage and disability 
of any income earner (a broader targeting criteria was used by the Government).31 
Similarly, Government-financed disability and death grants in Pakistan also used 
the second criteria. However, Bank-financed cash grants in Pakistan were targeted 
to the poorest and most vulnerable households within category (i) who did not 
have a government official in the household. Families headed by women who 
were not currently married, families with disabled member or families with five or 
more children (including orphans) were targeted with cash transfers—about 36 
percent of affected households. In Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the main cash transfer 
program (Samurdhi, Sri Lanka and Bait-ul-Mal, Pakistan) were expected to 
absorb households who remained in poverty status after emergency cash transfers 
were terminated, although it is not clear what steps were taken to ensure this 
would happen. 
 
• Method of delivery. The Bank-financed cash grants in Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
used bank accounts to deliver cash transfers. In Pakistan, when beneficiaries did 
not have bank accounts, the Government allowed them to open accounts in any 
nationalized bank. In the case of death and disability grants in Pakistan, and cash 
transfers in Maldives, government officials and/or army personnel personally 
delivered the cash to households. 
 
• Time of Delivery. Maldives delivered cash transfers to most beneficiaries within 
one month of the tsunami. This was possible because the number of households 
was smaller relative to Pakistan and Sri Lanka and the Government used a very 
simple process noted above. In Pakistan’s cash grant program beneficiaries were 
identified within 4 months of the earthquake and cash grants started in April, 2006 
some five months after the earthquake. However, by November 2006, households 
had received five or six payments. Responsibility for the delay was attributable in 
part to the difficulty of setting up targeting, disbursing, and monitoring systems 
through a completely new government agency with no prior experience of 
delivering cash transfers, remote location, and the difficulty of benchmarking in 
                                                 
31The Government’s criteria were broader and included loss of any household member (disabled or 
missing), loss of business assets and loss of income: wage/salary employment or income from self-
employment and disability of any household member. Vishwanath, T and Narayan, A (2005) “Insights 
from a beneficiary assessment survey: Implications for the re-imbursement of cash grants”. Memo. 
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an area with a large informal economy.32 In Sri Lanka, the first cash transfer to all 
beneficiaries was delivered in March/April, three months after the Tsunami.  
 
• Delivery agency/systems. In Pakistan, the national cash transfer agency, the Bait-
ul-Mal, was not used to deliver Bank financed cash transfers. The Earthquake 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority under the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat oversaw cash grant delivery, with participation from local 
governments and communities. Targeting teams comprising local government 
officials, working with communities, collected information using an open process 
and information campaigns, verified the targeting process, while appeals were 
handled by union councils. A monitoring system to track payments, manage 
appeals and cross check errors was developed NADRA, while a third party cross 
checking was instituted.33 In Sri Lanka, the local governments, together with 
communities identified beneficiaries in affected communities and benefits were 
delivered through bank accounts. In Maldives, army and civil servants teams 
delivered social assistance in collaboration with the main social assistance 
program. Task teams visited all affected islands; the eligibility criteria were 
damage to the house of the individual. This was visually confirmed by the task 
teams on their first day on the island. The following day, task teams gathered the 
population and made the payment in cash, maintaining a basic list of beneficiaries 
 
• Mix of social protection instruments. The Bank focused on cash support in the 
short and medium term, except in Pakistan, where for the first time the Bank also 
financed disability and social care services (community-based rehabilitation). 
However, donors such as ILO (Sri Lanka) and Oxfam (India) also supported 
workfare programs to provide temporary employment for beneficiaries after the 
Tsunami. 
 
Evidence on Impact of Disaster Income Support in South Asia 
 
These variations in basic design of social protection support raise the question of whether 
interventions actually increased household income and how cash transfers and other 
assistance could be designed for greater impact. To answer these questions would require 
further much needed research that goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, some 
initial results from surveys on cash transfer recipients from Sri Lanka and Maldives are 
summarized below. An impact evaluation of the emergency cash transfers in Pakistan is 
underway.34 
 
                                                 
32 Earthquake reconstruction—and the livelihood cash grants—are handled by the Earthquake 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority, which was created after the earthquake in the Prime 
Minister’s Secretariat. 
33 Vishwanath, T and Narayan, A. “Livelihood Cash Grants in the Aftermath of Disasters: Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan” (2006).  
34 Vishwanath, T and Narayan, A. “Livelihood Cash Grants in the Aftermath of Disasters: Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan” (2006).  
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• In Maldives, government records show that more than 53,000 people were helped by 
the cash grant within one month of the tsunami, and a further 5,000 people who were 
missed out in the first round got help later. A survey was carried out of socio-
economic conditions before the tsunami and six months after.35 The surveys shows 
that the support was well targeted: more than three-quarters of the affected population 
received cash grants, the share being higher for those most directly affected. The 
grants were also well targeted geographically. Islands hit more severely received 
more in-kind and financial aid.36 
 
• A beneficiary assessment of the Sri Lanka cash grants program, completed after the 
first two rounds had been disbursed, reviewed the targeting and implementation of the 
cash transfers, and made recommendations for the final rounds. Key findings from the 
survey were:  
• Targeting: The assessment showed that few affected households were 
excluded from receiving cash transfers. However, many households who 
should not have received the grant did so. About 25 percent of households 
who received the transfer were ineligible according to the Government’s 
inclusion criteria and 65 percent according to the Bank’s more restrictive 
criteria (see targeting criteria above). Some of the inclusion errors were the 
result of pressures on the local authorities to include everyone. Based on this 
finding, targeting was made more restrictive, with a much smaller number of 
households qualifying for assistance in subsequent rounds, though phasing in 
more restrictive targeting proved difficult.37  
• Incentives: The termination of the cash grants can be politically difficult 
because it means revoking a perceived entitlement. There was considerable 
demand in Sri Lanka (also in Pakistan) to continue the grants, with potentially 
adverse work incentives and upward pressure on wages and prices—
particularly given large amount of benefit (especially in Pakistan). This 
pressure to increase benefit might have been all the more great if affected 
areas continued to be economically depressed, particularly given the finding 
of the survey that many of the beneficiaries were workers or self-employed 
whose loss of income and assets from the tsunami was significant. Phasing out 
cash grants, under these conditions might require stimulating income 
generation, either through workfare or access to subsidized micro-credit. 
                                                 
35 “Tsunami Impact Assessment Survey 2005: A socio-economic countrywide assessment at household 
level, six months after the tsunami”, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Maldives. 
36 The food rations were largely adequate: around 80 percent of highly affected households answered that 
the amounts of rice, sugar, and bottled water provided were sufficient to meet their needs. The incidence of 
food shortage fell rapidly after peaking in late December, 2004 and by February, 2005 rates of food 
insecurity were back to pre-tsunami levels. Moreover, six months after the tsunami, employment had 
recovered and household income was already higher than before the disaster.  
37 More than 61 percent of the recipients reported no damage to their houses (partial or full) in the survey 
questionnaire, while 33 percent reported some damage to their housing. The fact that the proportion of 
applicants with damaged housing is quite similar between those who were approved and those who were 
rejected, indicates arbitrariness in targeting this program. 
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Lessons Learned: Design and Implementation 
 
Whichever type of benefit is offered, success requires careful attention to details of 
design and implementation—how will support be targeted, distributed, to whom, how 
much, and for how long? Since it takes time to design support instruments, approve their 
funding, and especially to set up implementation arrangements, there are advantages of 
drawing up plans for disaster response and building implementation capacity before 
disaster strikes, and working with existing agencies that deliver cash transfers to the poor. 
This section discusses some of the design parameters for successful cash transfer (social 
assistance) support. Although a lot remains to be learned in this area, some tentative 
lessons of best-practice design of emergency income support can be distilled from the 
reviewed experience: 
 
• Preference for Cash. The form of income support should be cash unless there is 
evidence that food markets have been disrupted. In rapid-onset disasters, food and 
other in-kind income support can often play a useful role in the immediate post-
disaster period because the disaster often resulted in disturbance of markets. 
However, in-kind support should eventually be discontinued and converted to cash 
support, except if food markets remain interrupted. In slow-onset disasters (other than 
conflicts), food markets are much less likely to be disturbed and the argument for 
cash is therefore stronger. 
 
•  Eligibility Conditions. Targeting can be either universal—all households in affected 
areas—or, if the number of victims is large relative to resources available—targeted 
to those most in need. The best approach depends on the purpose of the assistance 
(short-term recovery and food security or combating long-term vulnerability); the 
scope of the disaster (small and localized or large); and on what indicators can best be 
verified.  
 
o Targeting all those affected by the disaster, using simple, transparent and 
monitorable criteria has merit in small to medium disasters, e.g., targeting 
those who lost asset or house has merit if the objective is to help all the 
affected regardless of their pre-disaster income status. It can be a relatively 
simple, cheap, quick, and transparent method, as the Maldives example 
illustrates, although it runs the risk of excluding the homeless and people 
renting or without secure tenure. It also runs the risk of including people not 
very directly affected as the Sri Lanka example illustrates. 
 
o Targeting the poor has greater merit in very large disasters where budget 
constraints may lead to a need to target, and in the medium term where the 
objective shifts to helping only that subset of the population that is at risk of 
becoming chronically poor without help. 38  Despite the most careful 
targeting, while exclusion errors should be minimal, a larger error of 
inclusion in times of disasters is to be expected. Strengthening the capacity 
                                                 
38 Vishwanath, Tara and team (2006), “Livelihood Support Cash Grants in Earthquake Affected Areas in 
Pakistan, Powerpoint Presentation. 
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of the main social assistance agency to deliver cash transfers in times of 
emergency is therefore essential (see more on this below). Experience from 
both Pakistan and Sri Lanka shows that a targeting system for disaster 
victims at the time of the event itself can be costly and difficult to 
implement, with huge data needs, is very demanding of scarce managerial 
resources, and can result in delays in benefit delivery and compromised 
targeting effectiveness. 
  
• Providing transfers using death and disability as eligibility criteria may have 
additional moral hazard implications, particularly where administration and record 
keeping are weak. For example, providing death benefits can run the risk of over-
stated disability or casualty figures because of false claims. One way around this, at 
least in the case of disability, is for grants to disabled to be provided to the most 
obvious disabilities—loss of limb, for example, given difficulties of ascertaining and 
certifying less visible disabilities. 
 
• Level of Benefit. The amount of support should be adequate for subsistence but not so 
much as to jeopardize work incentives. These amounts might be higher than provided 
by the main social assistance program (if these are very low) but only initially, and 
then should decline over time, to avoid adverse incentives, promote equity with other 
beneficiaries and contain fiscal costs. 
 
• Duration and Frequency of Benefit. Timely cash support should follow for a period 
that would be very limited for most households, but that could stretch into the 
medium term for the more vulnerable, with these individuals being absorbed into the 
main cash transfer/social assistance system if poverty persists. Ascertaining the 
correct amount of emergency income support requires more research. However, a 
possibility would be, in small-to-medium sized emergencies, to provide a first larger 
transfer to all affected, followed by a second somewhat smaller transfer to all 
households after perhaps 3 months, with transfers narrowly targeted to vulnerable 
households after this period through the main social assistance system. In very large 
emergencies, targeting of households in affected areas may be required with the most 
vulnerable requiring longer duration of support (through the main social assistance 
system). The frequency of benefit could be staggered over time if good banking 
channels exist, otherwise infrequent or one-off transfers may be better in order to 
reduce transaction costs for program administrators and beneficiaries and to provide 
timely transfers.  
 
• Managing Expectations. Managing expectations of beneficiaries is important in most 
entitlement programs. Providing cash grants to beneficiaries increases their 
expectations of continuing this entitlement. Ensuring that the public is aware about 
the one off nature of the grants and enforcing strict limits on grants duration (and 
potentially keeping benefit frequency low—one or two rounds as most) would be 
important to mitigate these pressures. Those who continue to be poor should be 
folded into the main cash transfer program (with adequate financing to the program 
provided). If employment does not rebound at the time of termination of cash 
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transfers, some time-bound form of conditional grant might be introduced, for 
example workfare and/or micro-credit. 
 
• Payment Mechanism. For reasons of security and fraud prevention, well-developed 
banking systems should deliver cash transfers, with uncovered beneficiaries assisted 
to open bank accounts. However, determining the best approach for delivering cash 
transfers in low-income settings—private agents, post offices--requires more 
research. Cash-in-hand by public servants or army officials may also avoid the delays 
of opening bank accounts, where opening accounts may take some time. Depending 
on the risks of fraud, insecurity, and corruption, it may prove possible to safeguard 
direct cash disbursement by the public agency to a reasonable extent, especially for a 
limited period.  
 
• Monitoring and Evaluation Surveys and other tools for gauging the effectiveness of 
the targeting and other administrative processes for delivering cash transfers or other 
social protection instruments used in emergencies should be instituted where possible. 
Given enormous data requirements for administrating cash transfer programs, MIS 
system to, inter alia, register beneficiaries and monitor payments is also essential for 
effective delivery of social protection to affected households. These systems should 
be already in place in national social protection agencies, with options to expand 
when disasters unfold. 
 
• Strengthening the Capacity of the Main Social Assistance agency. Ideally, the main 
safety net agency should coordinate or deliver cash grants to affected areas in 
partnership with local agencies. For this to be possible, the regular safety net 
programs would need budgetary and logistic mechanisms for scaling up in disasters, 
including provisions for taking on additional staff to handle the logistics of 
emergency support in disaster situations. Building program capacity for timely and 
efficient delivery of support to affected households within existing cash transfer 
agencies, even if these capacities do not exist, should be an important component of 
ex-ante disaster planning.  
 
• Mix of instruments. Cash transfers can help to flexibly address the basic needs of 
households where food markets are functioning well. However, if employment does 
not recover as the duration of cash transfers ends, other (time-bound) instruments 
such as workfare or micro-credit may be needed in combination with cash transfers to 
help families avoid poverty.  
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4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SCOPE FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Summing up the above, social protection support, particularly cash transfers, has been an 
important and well-performing part of the disaster response in several major recent 
disasters and will be needed in future disasters. As noted in this paper, these instruments 
have also been used to help households cope with income loss in post-conflict situations 
and in times of economic crisis To prepare for better design and more timely and efficient 
delivery in future disasters, this section lists implications and possible next steps for the 
client countries and for the Bank. 
  
Implications for client countries 
 
As part of government disaster planning efforts, countries could plan social protection 
responses aiming for swift, equitable, and consistent deployment of support. These plans 
would include emergency income support as an essential function of the country’s main 
cash transfer program, with implementation ensuring that this support is timely, efficient, 
and equitable for those affected by disasters. This means that countries would need to 
start investing in their main cash transfer programs to improve their administrative 
efficiency to respond to natural disasters 
 
 Ex-ante design and planning for emergency social assistance would provide 
answers to the key questions of disaster intervention design: what are the form, amount, 
and duration of emergency social protection support. What should be the type (or mix) of 
social protection instruments, e.g., cash, workfare and social care services? Who should 
be eligible for support and how targeted? Which agency should be responsible for its 
delivery? Plans and implementation arrangements would vary by country and type of 
disaster, but there are many basic principles that need discussion and agreement ex-ante. 
Perhaps most importantly, the implementation agency should be designated and start 
building the necessary response as part of the Government’s overall emergency response 
and social protection system.  
 
 Possible lead agencies in South Asia for emergency income support could be: 
 
• In Bangladesh, the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management already runs 
safety net programs that are triggered periodically by disasters, and would 
probably be well-placed to take the lead on this in coordination with others 
agencies, e.g., local government.  
• In India, the Disaster Management Authorities at national and state level (who 
report to the chief ministers) could coordinate efforts, working with relevant 
safety net agencies, together with the Ministry of Social Welfare that delivers cash 
transfers (social pensions, disability payments, etc.) 
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• In Nepal, the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Disaster Relief Section is the apex body 
for disaster management responsible for rescue and relief to disaster victims, and 
together with the Ministry of Social Welfare could perhaps lead these efforts. 
• In Pakistan, the main federal cash transfer agency, Bait-ul-Mal, could take the 
lead in coordination with other federal and provincial authorities. 
• In Sri Lanka, the main safety net program Samurdhi is one agency that could lead 
the efforts. 
 
Implications for the Bank 
 
Given recent experience and the likelihood that Bank support for disasters will be 
required in the future, it is important to consider how best to provide timely and high 
quality social protection support. Recent experience has shown a remarkable variation in 
the design and execution of Bank-supported emergency income support. It has shown that 
even if financing is timely, procurement and technical delays can still adversely affect the 
efficiency of Bank support in emergencies.  
 
 The Bank could enhance its operational effectiveness in the following ways: 
 
• Integrate social protection as a key component of the ex-ante planning already 
ongoing as part of the countries’ general hazard management work and supported 
by the new Bank-led Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, and 
the South Asia Regional Hazard Risk Management Program. Efforts will need to 
be country-specific. Each country’s hazard management plan or strategy would 
contain a section elaborating on deployment of social protection in case of an 
emergency.  
 
• Develop a best-practice toolkit that would help task teams and client countries 
design emergency income support programs, including monitoring systems, in 
accordance with international benchmarks. This would enable more consistent 
advice and streamlined project delivery.  
 
• Provide capacity building of designated safety net agencies to respond to 
disasters, e.g., advance operational planning, Management Information Systems, 
and mechanisms for expanding cash transfers and other programs, as well as 
requisitioning additional staff and budgets in future disasters. This support could 
be provided as part of the safety net capacity building on-going in several 
countries, or could be initiated as part of the planning for natural disasters in the 
country’s main social assistance agencies. In cases of emergency in countries 
where this capacity is weak, utilizing the main cash transfer/social protection 
agency at the time of the disaster to deliver cash transfers would be beneficial for 
two reasons: (i) it could help strengthen the regular safety net program and 
increase its capacity to deliver emergency cash transfers; and (ii) working with the 
main agency, can help disaster-affected individuals that are long-term poor 
integrate with the main safety net program.  
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• Consider on-time post-disaster technical assistance and implementation support 
to enable task teams to support best-practice implementation from the onset of the 
disaster, even before loans are processed. The Bank could award contingent stand-
by contracts to firms with the required expertise to become effective immediately 
upon a disaster, anywhere in the world. Work under such contracts could be 
financed either from a trust fund or from some kind of revolving fund (to be 
replenished by borrowing countries after loan processing). The Bank and other 
donors could even go one-step further and establish ex-ante funding for the cash 
transfers and other social protection support through contingency financing 
instruments that would become effective upon the occurrence of an emergency 
event as the Bank’s new policy on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies 
(BP/OP8.0) opens for. Given that South Asia is prone to disasters, it could well 
spearhead such innovations. 
 
 The social protection policy options outlined above are intended to help the 
countries cope better with natural disasters and other emergencies. Ultimately, in concert 
with other measures, rapid and high quality social protection support could assist affected 
populations to meet their basic needs, restore their income, and avoid irreversible losses 
of physical and human capital that would lead them deep into poverty. 
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ANNEX 1: DISASTER MAPS AND STATISTICS 
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Table 2: Natural Disasters in South Asia, 1990-2007: Number of Events, by Type 
 Afghani-
stan 
Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri 
Lanka 
Total 
Drought 2 0 0 4 0 1 1 1 9 
Earthquake 21 4 0 8 0 1 13 0 47 
Epidemic 19 15 1 37 0 14 9 2 97 
Extreme 
Temperature 
5 16 0 19 0 2 12 0 54 
Flood 43 39 3 105 0 14 37 24 265 
Insect 
Infestation 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Slides 7 0 0 23 0 8 10 1 49 
Wave / Surge 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 6 
Wild Fires 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 5 
Wind Storm 4 77 1 49 1 2 12 1 147 
Total 103 153 6 249 2 44 95 30 682 
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database on www.em-dat.net. 
 
Table 3: Natural Disasters in South Asia, 1990-2007: Number of Deaths 
 Afghani-
stan 
Bangla-
desh 
Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri 
Lanka 
Total 
Drought 37 0 0 20 0 0 143 0 200 
Earthquake 8640 31 0 32707 0 0 73823 0 115201 
Epidemic 3828 3732 0 3093 0 3164 246 3 14066 
Extreme 
Temperature 
572 2001 0 8590 0 108 1211 0 12482 
Flood 2915 2974 222 20760 0 3151 5805 391 36218 
Insect 
Infestation 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slides 657 0 0 1845 0 1001 240 65 3808 
Wave / 
Surge 
0 3 0 16789 102 0 0 35399 52293 
Wild Fires 0 0 0 6 0 88 0 0 94 
Wind Storm 341 143671 17 18503 0 26 1083 5 163646 
Total 16990 152412 239 102313 102 7538 82551 35863 398008 
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database on www.em-dat.net. 
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ANNEX 2: CASH VERSUS IN-KIND 
 
The debate on cash versus food and other in-kind support is an old theme in development 
economics. Compared to food, cash is often superior because of its versatility, the dignity 
and choice it offers to beneficiaries, and its lower transaction costs thanks to easier 
transport, storage, and accounting. Further, many beneficiaries of food, clothing, 
blankets, or buckets have been known to resell these items in local markets, at a discount. 
Were recipients offered cash instead, they would often be able to purchase these items 
easily in local markets. Moreover, large-scale imports of food grains can depress local 
market prices and adversely affect producer incentives for local farmers. Further, cash is 
often surprisingly safe to move and distribute, in part because it is less visible than food 
transports. In fact, cash has been used successfully in complex emergencies, in countries 
with weak banking systems, and in countries in conflict; cash was even used in lawless 
Somalia, relying on traditional hawala banking channels. In contrast, moving in-kind 
supplies, coordinating their distribution, and safeguarding them from theft and abuse is 
hard, even in normal times, and more so in disaster situations. 
 
 In-kind support is justified under specific circumstances: when food and basic 
goods are unavailable in local markets, or where benefits are to be targeted to specific 
household members as with supplementary feeding of infants or school meals to students. 
These circumstances sometimes exist in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, especially 
if normal roads and supply channels have been interrupted. In such circumstances, cash 
could cause inflation in the price of key basic goods and there is a strong case for food 
and other in-kind relief.  
 
 The time dimension is important: emergency supplies of food, water, blankets, 
tents, roofing sheets, and water containers have saved many lives immediately after 
severe disasters. Yet most countries have active private trading channels that bounce back 
quickly after disasters that can often supply essential goods at lower cost than donor 
operations. South Asian countries, for example, have opened to international trade in food 
and have vibrant private trading channels. When donors or governments prolong their in-
kind support, as they often do, they undermine private traders, market recovery, and local 
producer incentives. They also play to the sometimes well-founded suspicion that their 
choice of support is more motivated by donors’ interest in reducing excess food stocks 
than by the need of the recipients. 
 
 A major new study of cash support in the humanitarian sector finds that its use is 
growing but lacks much behind potential and should be expanded. The study notes that: 
 
“Cash should not be seen as a sector in its own right, but as a mechanism 
that needs to be considered across all sectors of humanitarian response. As 
such, all relief practitioners should see cash as one of the options available 
to them. This implies that information on how to implement cash based 
responses should be included in generic policies and guidelines, in 
induction training for new staff, in technical training courses, for instance 
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on assessment methodologies, and in disaster preparedness and 
contingency planning processes……. 
……Donors will also need to develop the skills and capacity to make 
informed decisions about whether to fund cash responses. The central role 
played by national governments in providing cash aid in Pakistan and 
following the Indian Ocean tsunami suggests that, where governments 
have the capacity, they are the most appropriate delivery channels.”39 
                                                 
39 Paul Harvey: “Cash-based responses in emergencies”, ODI Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Report 
24, 2007. 
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ANNEX 3: TURKEY 1999 EARTHQUAKE – OVERVIEW OF 
EFFORTS AND IMPACTS 
 
The lessons from this natural disaster seem to have inspired efforts after later South Asian 
events, and are therefore worth dwelling upon. Probably because more time has lapsed, 
more evidence is available on the performance of assistance given in response to this 
natural disaster, which is briefly summarized here. 
 
 The Government rolled out a range of support programs in response to the 
Earthquake. Accommodation assistance was offered in cash to households that had 
suffered medium or heavy damage to their homes and that choose not to avail of free 
housing in public facilities. A one-time grant was also given to repair damaged housing. 
This was complemented by social assistance in the form of a one-time lump-sum 
payment for each death and permanent disability. The benefit levels were TL 750 million 
per death, TL500 million per first degree disability and TL 300 million per second degree 
disability (US$653-1632). In addition, survivor and disability pensions were introduced. 
 
 Efforts were successful. Impacts have been reviewed, for example in the 
Investment Completion Report (ICR) and in an IEG evaluation report. 40  The cash 
allowances were viewed as an important step in helping people cope with the effects of 
the earthquake, overcome trauma, and reintegrate into normal life. The provision of cash 
allowances was a tangible sign of the government’s efforts to help the victims, and had a 
positive impact not only on the material living conditions of recipients, but on their 
psychological orientation as well. The cash nature of the benefits was important, both in 
terms of meeting the needs of the recipients (the applicants revealed a strong preference 
for assistance in cash as preferable to aid in kind) and in the logistics of getting assistance 
to victims quickly, which could not have been done if benefits were in kind. In 
conclusion, cash transfer projects can make an important contribution to recovery. 
 
 Some lessons from Turkey’s experience for other efforts are: 
 
• It was possible to effectively and accurately administer emergency cash transfers 
on a large scale. 
• Using institutions with cash transfer experience (that already have the necessary 
human resources and management systems in place) was critical to smooth 
delivery of the assistance program. 
• Getting cash support to victims quickly had positive effects on the economy and 
on people’s sense of safety and security. It was a prominent first sign of the 
government’s support in a time of acute need. 
• The process was streamlined by the agency delivering the cash, who worked 
together with volunteers, other government agencies, and NGOs. In one project 
                                                 
40 See 
http://imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/07/15/000160016_2005071514
4818/Rendered/PDF/326760TR.pdf 
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site, application processing, bank account creation (for allowances), and result 
notification were combined into one procedure.  
• Because cash transfer runs the risk of creating dependency, public awareness 
campaigns are required that make it clear up front the number of months that 
payments will be made. When beneficiaries know this, they can make informed 
resource allocation decisions. Otherwise, going month to month without clear 
information on the duration of payments can lead to dependency beyond the short 
term. 
 
